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TIME FOR A CHANGE IN EMINENT DOMAIN: A "DIRT 
FARMER'S" STORY SHOWS WHY JUST COMPENSATION 
SHOULD INCLUDE LOST PROFITS 
Edward Walton • 
INTRODUCTION 
The story of Kelo v. New Londorr has become famous,3 but perhaps more in-
credible than the story is the bipartisan response.4 Fueled by "post-Kelo outrage,"~ 
politicians put aside their partisan differences to form unlikely alliances: "Senator John 
Comyn (R-Tex.) ... found himself on the same side of the issue as Representative 
Maxine Waters (D-Calif.), a liberal, and Representative Bernard Sanders (I-Vt.), a 
self-described socialist.'o6 In effect, the U.S. Supreme Court's 2005 Kelo decision inad-
vertently provided legislators with a bipartisan opportunity: eminent domain reform. 7 
In Kelo, the Court considered whether condemning homes, as part of the city of 
New London's development plan, "qualifl:ied] as a 'public use' within the meaning 
of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. "8 The goal of the 
"development plan" was ''to create in excess of 1,000 jobs, to increase tax and other 
revenues, and to revitalize an economically distressed city.'o9 To accomplish those 
ends, the plan aimed to redevelop "90 acres of Fort Trumbull in order to comple-
ment the facility that Pfizer was planning to build ... .''10 The catch, however, was 
"' JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2019. BA, Wake Forest University, 2011. 
I would like to thank my friends, family, and teachers for their support in all my endeavors. 
Also a special thanks to the editorial staff and executive board of the William & Mary Bill of 
Rights Journal for all of their guidance and hard work in preparing this Note for publication. 
2 545 u.s. 469 (2005). 
3 See id.; LITILE PINK HOUSE (Korchula Productions 20 17). 
4 CARIAT.MAIN,BULI.DOZED:''KELo,"EMINENTDoMAJN,AND1HEAMERICANLUSTFOR 
LAND 174--79 (2007). See also Ron Arnold, A Big Victory for Restoring Private Property 
Rights, WASH.ExAMINER(Mar.l,2012, 12:00AM),http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/a 
-big-victoty-for-restoring-private-property-rights/arti.cle/327151 [https:/ /perma.cc/GU84-RJ5R]. 
5 MAIN, supra note 4, at 178. 
6 Id. at 178-79. 
7 Id. (''In the seven days following Kelo, the U.S. House ofRepresentatives spit out bill 
after bill with heroic titles like the Protection ofHomes, Small Businesses and Private Property 
Act; the Eminent Domain Limitation Act; and the Private Property Rights Protection Act. 
Aside from situations of national emergency or war, Congress rarely moves so fast''). 
8 545 U.S. at 472, 475; U.S. CONST. amend. V (''nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation."). 
~ Kelo, 545 U.S. at 472. 
10 Id. at 495 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted). 
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that certain homeowners had to leave their homes to implement the plan. 11 Facing 
condemnation, the homeowners "contend[ ed] that using eminent domain for eco-
nomic development impermissibly blurs the boundary between public and private 
takings,''12 a notion the Court rejected.13 In her dissent, Justice O'Connor harshly 
critiqued the majority opinion and its broad understanding of"public use": 
To reason, as the Court does, that the incidental public benefits re-
sulting from the subsequent ordinary use of private property render 
economic development takings 'for public use' is to wash out any 
distinction between private and public use of property-and 
thereby effectively to delete the words 'for public use' from the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.14 
For Justice 0' Connor, the Court's holding and interpretation of"public use" had 
serious implications: "The specter of condemnation hangs over all property. Nothing 
is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home 
with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory."1' It seems Americans shared 
Justice O'Connor's concerns: "An MSNBC website poll revealed that ninety-eight 
percent of Americans disagreed with the Supreme Court's decision. " 16 
Unfortunately, in New London, not only did the property owners lose their 
homes, but in 2009 Pfizer "announced it would leave the city."17 With its departure, 
Pfizer "pull[ed] 1,400 jobs .... "18 Effectively, "[t]hey stole our home for economic 
development," Mr. Cristofaro explained to the New York Times. 19 "It was all for Pfizer, 
and now they get up and walk away."20 
Kelo sparked national concerns over eminent domain abuse, presenting unique poli-
tical opportunities for bipartisan allegiances and widespread reform. 21 For example, on 
the federal level, the bipartisan duo of Congresswoman Maxine Waters (D-CA) and 
Congressman Jim Sensenbrenner (R-Wis.) found a convergence of interests in "curbing 
11 I d. at 4 75 (majority opinion). 
12 Id. at 485. 
13 See id. at 490. 
14 Id. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
15 Id. at 503. 
16 MAIN, supra note 4, at 174. 
17 Patrick McGeehan, Pfizer to Leave City That Won Land-Use Case, N.Y. TIMBs(Nov.l2, 
2009), https://nyti.ms/2kY5vlw. 
11 Id. 
19 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
20 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
21 Ilya Somin, The Political and Judicial Reaction to Kelo, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CON-
SPIRACY (June 4, 20 15), https:/ /www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracylwp/2015 
/06/04/the-political-and-judicial-reaction-to-kelo/?utm _ term=.3d4 73bbfa06d [https ://perma 
.cc/KW48-WW8F]. 
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eminent domain abuses. ,,nAsa result, they sponsored the Private Property Rights Pro-
tection Act, a bill designed to protect against "eminent domain power to transfer private 
property to other private parties for the purpose of economic development."23 The pair 
have supported the legislation for years, even passing it in "the House in 2005, 2012, 
and 2014."24 
Sensenbrenner and Waters have complementary goals in supporting the legisla-
tion. Congressman Sensenbrenner aims to ''restore the government's power of 
eminent domain to its limited, proper role."25 Congresswoman Waters, on the other 
hand, hopes to prevent eminent domain abuses that have impacted "[b ]etween 3 and 
4 million Americans, most of them ethnic minorities."26 She explained that since the 
1940s, these individuals "have been forcibly displaced from their homes as a result 
of urban renewal takings."27 These takings often come "at the expense ofthe poor 
and politically weak."28 
In addition to politicians working across the aisle, a broad range of advocacy 
groups and states have addressed eminent domain abuses.29 For example, an impres-
sive coalition of groups has come together, including the NAACP, ''the Farm Bureau, 
the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and theN ational Fed-
eration oflndependent Business."30 But arguably the most effective response to Kelo 
has come from the states: "forty-four states have reformed their eminent domain 
laws."31 Moreover, "[a] dozen states have gone even further and amended their state 
constitutions to stop eminent domain for private gain.'m 
22 Press Release, Maxine Waters, Representative, House ofR.epresentatives, Representatives 
Waters, Sensenbrenner Reintroduce the Private Property Rights Protection Act (Mar. 22, 2017), 
https://waters.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/congressman-waters-reintroduces-pri 
vate-property-rights-protection-act [https :/ /perma.cc/5XVW -KJLS] [hereinafter Press Release, 
Maxine Waters]. 
23 Id. 
24 Ilya Somin, House Passes Private Property Rights Protection Act-But Celebration 
is Premature, REASON: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 26, 2018), https://reason.com/vol 
okh/20 18/07 /26/houses-passes-property-rights-protection [https:/ /penna.cc/Z4LN -6TD7]. 
25 Press Release, Maxine Waters, supra note 22. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 House Tries to Rewrite Eminent Domain Rules, CBS NEWS (Feb. 28, 2012, 9:40PM), 
https:/ /www.cbsnews.com/news/house-tries-to-rewrite-eminent-domain-rules [https:/ /perma 
.cc/BP6L-4VB9]. 
29 Nick Sibilla, It's Time For Congress To Actively Condemn Eminent Domain Abuses, 
FORBES (June 28, 2013, 8:00AM), https:/ /www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/20 13/06/28/its-time 
-for-congress-to-actively-condemn-eminent-domain-abuses/#6ec8389964c2 [https://perma.cc 
/D87Q-ETIW]. 
30 Id. 
31 Eminent Domain, INsT. JusT., http://ij.org/issueslprivate-property/eminent-domain [https:// 
penna.cc/ML2T -DKGW]. 
32 Id. 
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With the country wary of eminent domain and open to curbing abuses following 
Kelo, now is a perfect time to implement other common-sense reforms to protect 
against eminent domain abuses, including fixing interpretations of just compensation 
in the Takings Clause. Specifically,just compensation under the Takings Clause in the 
Fifth Amendment should include consequential damages/3 such as "loss of profits,"34 
"business good will,'>J5 and "going-concern value."36 The importance of these reforms 
can be seen through the stmy of Chad Jarreau, a Louisiana dirt farmer whose property 
was taken. 37 
In Jarreau's case, the taking of his land impacted his dirt excavation business, 
leading the trial court to award him "$164, 705.40 for economic and business losses. "38 
However, the Louisiana Supreme Court disagreed, denying lost profits to Jarreau for 
his business losses and limiting his compensation to ''that required by the Fifth Amend-
ment, which is the fair market value of the property at the time of the appropriation"-
an award of$11,869.39 
To properly accommodate property owners like Jarreau for their losses, the 
Supreme Court should adopt the 1974 standard Louisiana had in place for takings 
compensation: "compensated to the full extent of [the] loss.'..w As the Louisiana Su-
preme Court explained, the standard required that the property owner "be placed in an 
equivalent financial position to that which he enjoyed before the taking. '>41 Anything 
33 See State v. Hammer, 550 P.2d 820, 823 n.2 (Alaska 1976). It should be noted that courts 
do not uniformly refer to these damages as consequential damages. For example, the Alaska 
Court stated: "[W]e prefer to call them incidental damages, reserving 'consequential' damages 
to describe losses to the remainder of a condemner's property in instances of partial taking." I d. 
34 Comment, Consequential Damages and "Just Compensation" in Federal Condemnations, 
18 u. em. L. REv. 349,349-50 (1951). 
3~ Id. at 350 n.5 ("Good will has been defined as the value of the business reputation of 
the finn and the patronage that accompanies it or as the value of anticipated future profits based 
on the past earnings of the business.''). 
36 Id. at 350 n.6 (noting that the going-concern value "consists of the intangible contri-
butions to the value of the business such as patronage and increased earning power because 
of skillful management''). 
37 S. Lafourche Levee Dist v. Jarreau, 217 So. 3d298 (La. 2017); Mark Sherman, Louisiana 
'DirtFarmer'AsksSupremeCourt'sHelp,U.S.NEws(Oct.26,2017,5:43AM),https:/lwww.us 
news.com/news/politics/articles/20 17-1 0-26/louisiana-dirt-farmer-asks-supreme-courts-help 
[https://perma.cc/D3RF-2A2V). 
38 Jarreau, 217 So. 3d at 302. 
39 Id. at 311-12. 
40 Id. at 306. 
41 Id. (discussing the more robust protections in place under the 1974 Louisiana Constitu-
tion). The 2006 Louisiana constitutional amendments removed these protections for takings 
related to hurricane protection projects. See La. CONST. art. 1, § 4( G) (adding § 4(G) to limit 
compensationforhurricaneprojects); id. art. 6, § 42;LA. STAT.ANN. § 38:301 (C)(1)(h);LA. 
STAT. ANN.§ 38:281(3)(defining "fair market value" for takings under article 1, section4(G) 
and article 6, section 42); LA. STAT. ANN.§ 38:281(4) (redefining "full extent of the loss" for 
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less than the "equivalent financial position" before the loss is not just compensation 
because the person is not being ''made whole, for actions taken against them.42 
The Supreme Court in Kimball Laundry co. v. United States43 supported the 
notion that compensation for temporary takings could include consequential damages, 
such as injury to the going-concern value. 44 The Court, however, limited compensa-
tion for consequential damages to temporary takings, not extending it to permanent 
takings, i.e., "[w]hen fee title to business property has been taken.'"'5 The Court 
should expand its understanding to permanent takings, because permanent takings 
tend to be more burdensome than temporary takings.46 Moreover, fair market value 
compensation often fails to satisfy just compensation requirements of putting the 
owner "in the same position monetarily as he would have occupied if his property 
had not been taken" as it fails to account for inciden1al costs or consequential damages 
resulting from the taking. 47 
The practical impact of requiring higher levels of compensation for takings is 
that the government might more judiciously utilize its eminent domain powers. 48 In 
effect, the higher costs for takings would incentivize the government to: {1) act 
cautiously in exercising its eminent domain power and be more selective in the lo-
cation choices for takings;49 and (2) provide advance notice to condemnees so they 
can alleviate disruptions to their businesses. 50 
Section LA ofthis Note offers a brief background on the origins ofthe Fifth 
Amendment and just compensation, exploring John Locke and James Madison's 
understandings of the proper role of government related to property and protection 
takings to a constricted understanding that "shall not exceed the market value" under article 
1, section 4(G) and article 6, section 42). 
42 Home v. Dep't of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2434 (2015) (finding the property owner 
''must be made whole" as the owner ''is entitled to be put in as good a position pecuniarily 
as if his property had not been taken ... .''). 
43 338 u.s. 1 (1949). 
44 Id. at 15. 
45 Id. at 14. 
46 I d. at23 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (''There would be a complete destruction of the trade-
routes if the taking of the plant were permanent and a depreciation of them (I assume) where 
it is temporary. Why the latter is compensable when the former is not is a mystery."). 
47 United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970); Luber v. Milwaukee Cty., 177 
N.W.2d 380, 384 (Wis. 1970) (''In theory, the market value standard is directed toward 
compensating the condemnee for the physical property loss suffered; thus it generally ex-
cludes recompense for incidental losses--losses typified by damage to or destruction of good 
will .... "(citations omitted)). 
4
' See State v. Hammer, 550 P .2d 820, 827 (Alaska 1976) ("The amount of such damages 
is a matter largely within the state's control.''). 
49 Amicus Curiae Brief of Pacific Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioners at 15, S. 
LafourcheLeveeDist. v. Jarreau, 217 So. 3d298 (La. 2017) (No. 17-163), 2017 WL 3867884 
[hereinafter Brief Amici Curiae Pacific Legal Foundation]. 
~0 Hammer, 550 P.2d at 827. 
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of rights. In Sections I.B and I.C, this Note examines the U.S. Supreme Court's, the 
Alaska Supreme Court's, and the Louisiana Supreme Court's interpretations of just 
compensation related to lost profits resulting from takings. 
Section II.A examines South Lafourche Levee District v. Jarreazr1 in order to 
highlight the importance of expanding just compensation to include lost profits. In 
particular, the taking ofJarreau's land significantly impacted Jarreau beyond the fair 
market value of his land, failing to provide him with the value of his dirt, ~2 disrupt-
ing fulfillment of his existing contracts,53 and imperiling his business's longevity 
and location. 54 
In Section ll.B, this Note rebuts three theories against awarding compensation 
for lost profits highlighted in State v. Hammer5: (1) ''that damage to personal property 
need not be compensated for''; (2) ''that the state has taken the land only, and not the 
business"; and (3) ''that the damages are too speculative to be awarded."~6 
Section ll. C considers a new standard for just compensation. Section ll. C.l 
explores why the Supreme Court should expand Kimball Laundry to include con-
sequential damages for temporary takings and permanent takings. Section ll.C.2 
looks at adopting the 1974 Louisiana standard "compensated to the full extent of 
[the] loss."" Finally, in Section II.D, this Note presents two crucial practical benefits 
of a broadened understanding of just compensation. 
I. HISTORY OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE AND JUST COMPENSATION 
A. Philosophical and Historical Development: Fifth Amendment and Just 
Compensation for Taking of Property 
To understand the development of the Just Compensation Clause and its inclusion 
in the Constitution, it is helpful to step back and consider the enlightenment thinkers 
that influenced the Founding Fathers. John Locke, in particular, had a major influence 
on the principles underlying the founding of America and is instructive in understand-
ing their conception of the proper role of government. 58 For Locke, people leave the 
51 217 So.3d 298 (La. 2017). 
52 Id See Brief Amici Curiae ofN ational Federation oflndependentBusiness Small Business 
Legal Center et al. in Support ofPetitioner at 20, S. Lafourche Levee Dist. v. Jarreau, 217 S. 
3d 298 (La 2017) (No. 17-163), 2017 WL 4231477 [hereinafter Brief Amici Curiae NFIB] 
("Jarreau has been denied compensation for his carefully cultivated commercial-grade dirt.''). 
53 See id. at 11-12. 
54 See id. at 13-14. 
55 550 P.2d 820 (Alaska 1976) 
56 Id. at 823. 
57 SeeS. Lafourche Levee Dist. v. Jarreau, 217 So. 3d 298, 306 (La. 2017). 
58 The Declaration oflndependence is one prominent example of Locke's influence on 
the Founding as the language of the Declaration mimics the ideas, and even some of the lan-
guage, of Locke. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT AND A LETIER 
CONCERNING TOLERATION 5 (J.W. Gough ed., Oxford: Basil Blackwell1948) (''The state of 
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state of nature and enter into civil society to receive certain protections of their 
individual rights not available in the state of nature. s9 The individual's rights are not 
safe in the state of nature-a state prior to the creation of society and government-
because "some individuals continually try to take that which by right belongs to 
others. "60 As a result, the individual faces"[ u ]ncertainty and insecurity," limiting the 
ability to plan, "which prevents individuals from effectively utilizing their talents 
and external goods. "61 They, therefore, leave the state of nature to attain certain pro-
tections through society.62 However, unless ''the sovereign is to be fully constrained, 
so that the lives, liberties, and estates of the citizens may be preserved," individuals 
will suffer the same abuses and uncertainty under an unconstrained government as 
they did in the state of nature. 63 The proper role of government is to determine "how 
the natural rights over labor and property can be preserved in form and enhanced in 
value by the exercise of political power. "64 
Similarly, James Madison, the author of the Bill ofRights, thought just govern-
ment ''protect[ s] property of every sort. ,ms In his 1792 essay Property, published after 
the Bill ofRights, Madison explained how a ''just government ... impartially secures" 
property rights of all citizens. 66 An unjust government, in contrast, takes property 
"by arbitrary seizures of one class of citizens for the service of the rest. 'o67 Property 
rights are more susceptible to these abuses "[ w ]here an excess of power prevails. •o68 
Madison explains how a just government cannot take property "directly even for 
public use without indemnification to the owner.'o69 Madison also warns that American 
nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one; and reason, which is that law, 
teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that, being all equal and independent, no one ought 
to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions."); see also THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE para 2 (U.S. 1776) ('We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are 
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among 
these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit ofHappiness."). 
j 9 See LOCKE, supra note 58, at 62 ("[I]n the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the 
enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the invasions of others .... This 
makes him willing to quit this condition, which, however free, is full of fear and continual 
dangers. . .. he seeks out and is willing to join in society with others. . .. for the mutual 
preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates."). 
60 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRivATE PROPERTY AND niE POWER OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN 3 (1985). 
61 Id. 
62 See LOCKE, supra note 58, at 62. 
63 EPSTEIN, supra note 60, at 163. 
64 Id. at3. 
6~ James Madison, Property, http:/ /press-pubs. uchicago.edulfounders/documents/v 1 ch16s 
23.html [https://permacc/HK.7Y-DZW2]. See also William Michael Treanor, The Origins 
and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE 
L.J. 694, 694 (1985). 
66 Madison, supra note 65. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
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government should not follow "a pattern" that "indirectly violates their property, 
in their actual possessions, in the labor that acquires their daily subsistence, and in the 
hallowed remnant of time which ought to relieve their fatigues and soothe their 
cares ... .''70 While Madison did not explicitly mention business losses, Madison's 
vision for property rights in America include protections for "indirect[] violat[ions ]" 
of property rights. 71 These indirect violations, such as interferences with the "labor 
that acquires their daily subsistence," resemble the business losses that indirectly 
result from a taking. 72 
Examining the language of the Constitution, the Fifth Amendment states: "nor 
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. " 73 Accord-
ing to the Supreme Court, just compensation includes the "full monetary equivalent 
of the property taken.'m More specifically, "[t]he owner is to be put in the same po-
sition monetarily as he would have occupied ifhis property had not been taken."'~ In 
other words, the property owner "must be made whole" as the owner "is entitled to 
be put in as good a position pecuniarily as ifhis property had not been taken .... "76 
Despite these precedents, the Court has reached differing conclusions on whether 
to extend compensation to consequential damages, such as going-concern value, 
depending on whether the taking is permanent or temporary. 77 
B. History ofCompensationfor Business Losses: Mitchell and Kimball Laundry 
In 1925, the Supreme Court in Mitchell v. United States78 denied "consequential 
damages for losses to [a] business, or for its des1ruction."79 The case arose from a 
taking in 1917 of 440 acres, where the plaintiff"rais[ed] [and canned] whole-grain 
Shoe Peg com.''80 In exchange for taking their "farm and canning plant" the govern-
ment provided $76,000 as compensation. 81 But after, the ''plaintiffs were ... unable 
70 Id. 
71 See id. 
72 See id. 
73 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
74 United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970). 
75 Id. 
76 Homev. Dep't. ofAgric., 135 S. Ct. 2419,2434 (2015) (quoting Olson v. United States, 
54 S. Ct. 704, 708 (1934)). See also U.S. v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943)("Such compensa-
tion means the full and perfect equivalent in money of the property taken. The owner is to 
be put in as good [a] position pecuniarily as he would have occupied ifhis property had not 
been taken.''). 
77 Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 11, 14-15 (1949) (providing com-
pensation for "demonstrable loss of going-concern value" wuler temporary takings). In contrast, 
compensation does not extend to permanent takings because ''the going-concern value has 
not been taken." I d. at 11. 
71 267 u.s. 341 (1925). 
79 Id. at 345. 
80 Mitchell v. United States, 58 Ct. Cl. 443, 443 (1923). 
11 Id. at 445. 
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to reestablish themselves in their former business of growing and canning this kind 
of com" because the government had taken "a very large part of the lands in that 
section of country available for and especially adapted to the growing of Shoe Peg 
com .... "82 The business losses did not matter to the Court: "[i]fthe business was 
destroyed, the destruction was an unintended incident ofthe taking ofland."83 
In 1949, the Court in Kimball Laundry adjusted its standard, interpreting just 
compensation to include consequential damages resulting from a temporary taking, 
such as going-concern value. 84 However, the Court only applied this rule to tempo-
rary takings, not permanent takings. 85 
In Kimball Laundry, the government took possession of a laundry property 
during WWII from November 22, 1942 until March 23, 1946.86 In addition to awarding 
the owner compensation for the rental value of the property, the Court also awarded 
compensation for intangible losses to the property, including "demonstrable loss of 
going-concern value. '.s7 The temporary taking effectively "appropriated the Laun-
dry's opportunity to profit from its trade routes," which "depriv[ ed] the owner of the 
going-concern value of his business," including goodwill they developed with 
customers. 88 Excellent service creates goodwill with customers and that goodwill has 
value because the customers ''will continue to want particular goods or services" 
from "a particular supplier ofthem.'789 In these circumstances, ''the intangible acquires 
a value to a potential purchaser no different from the value of the business' physical 
property. •'19o The Court explained that "[i]n determining the value of a business ... 
the goodwill and earning power due to effective organization are often more impor-
tant elements than tangible property.'r.~1 
The Court, in its assessment, made a distinction between a temporary taking and 
a permanent taking. 92 Since it was a temporary taking, the laundry owner's "investment 
remained bound up in the reversion of the property," and he could not relocate the busi-
ness to a new location because he still owned the premises taken by the government 93 
It would not make sense for the laundry to open a second location, especially given the 
uncertainty of when the condemned property would be free from government use. 94 
81 Id. 
83 Mitchell, 267 U.S. at 345. 
84 Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 15 (1949). 
8~ See id. at 11, 14-15. 
86 Id. at 3-4. 
87 Id. at 15-16. 
81 Id. at 13-14. 
89 Id. at 10. 
90 Id. at 11. 
91 Id. {internal quotations omitted). 
92 See id. at 14-15. 
93 Id. at 14. 
94 See id. 
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In contrast, the Court reasoned that a permanent taking allows the impacted 
owner to transfer locations and maintain the going-concern value of the business as 
"only the physical property has been condemned, leaving the owner free to move his 
business to a new location.'>9~ Therefore, permanent takings create no obligation to 
compensate for consequential damages to a business. 96 
C. Alaska and Louisiana: Other Jurisdictions Interpreting Just Compensation 
and Business Losses 
1. Alaska: State v. Hammer-"Loss of Profits Due to Business Interruption•>97 
The Alaska Supreme Court awarded lost profits compensation in State v. 
Hammer.98 In order to build a highway, the State of Alaska forced Richard Kito to 
vacate his leasehold and relocate his bar business on September 29, 1973.99 On the 
day Alaska vacated him, Kito had not yet found a new location for his bar. 100 He 
explored many "alternative locations, including dry-docking a small ferry boat," 
before he "fmally constructed a building for the bar, with the help of a substantial 
Small Business Administration loan.''101 His business ''reopened in July 1974, nine 
months after it had closed.''102 The jury in the trial court found that "five of the nine 
months" Kito had his business interrupted ''were directly caused by the state's taking 
ofKito's leasehold."103 
The Alaska Supreme Court assessed ''whether temporary loss of profits due to 
business interruption directly resulting from a state's taking of the land on which the 
business operated is a damage to property compensable under our constitution.''104 
Typically, incidental damages, 105 such as lost profits, are precluded from compensa-
tion as "a loss which does not give rise to an action for damages. " 106 The Alaska 
Supreme Court highlighted three theories courts use to reject awarding compensa-
tion for lost profits: (I) ''that damage to personal property need [not] be compen-
sated for;" (2) ''that the state has taken the land only, and not the business;" and (3) 
9~ I d. at 11 (citations omitted). 
96 Id. 
97 State v. Hammer, 550 P.2d 820, 823 (Alaska 1976). 
91 I d. at 825-27. 
99 Id. at 822. 
1oo Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 823. 
104 Id. 
10~ /d. at 823 n.2 (Alaska 1976). The Alaska Court prefers the phrase ''incidental damages" 
over "consequential damages." Id. 
106 Id. at 823. 
2019] TIME FOR A CHANGE IN EMINENT DOMAIN 1293 
''that the damages are too speculative to be awarded. "107 The Alaska Supreme Court 
rejected all three theories in Hammer. 108 
Concerning the first theory-"that damage to personal property need [not] be 
compensated for'.t09---under "statute and case law," Alaska includes ''personal prop-
erty" among ''the categories of property for which the condemnor must compensate 
the owner."110 
The Alaska Supreme Court also rejected the second theory, which denies com-
pensation because "the state has taken the land only," an approach found in the U.S. 
Supreme Court's ruling in Mitchell v. United States.111 Under Mitchell, the govern-
ment does not take or intend to take the business: "If the business was destroyed, the 
destruction was an unintended incident of the taking of the land."112 The Alaska 
Supreme Court found Mitchell's approach to have "several serious flaws."113 The 
first flaw was "looking at the benefit to the condemnor as a measure of compensation," 
not the "loss to the owner."114 The Mitchell approach, the Alaska Supreme Court 
explained, "conflicts with [Alaska's] principle of compensation, which, instead of 
looking at the benefit to the condemnor as a measure of compensation, looks to the 
loss to the owner."115 Similarly, the Court in Kimball Laundry acknowledged that 
point, relying on Justice Holmes's question: ''what has the owner lost, not what has 
the taker gained?"116 The second flaw with the Mitchell approach was its inapplica-
bility in Alaska.117 According to the Alaska Supreme Court, the Alaska Constitution 
has more stringent protections for just compensation than the U.S. Constitution, 
which "does not expressly require compensation for damage to property."118 
The third, and most important, flaw in the Mitchell approach is "it fails to provide 
a realistic measure of what has been taken."119 Specifically, the Alaska court criticized 
Mitchell because "[t]he court simply ignored, for the purposes of compensation, the 
destruction of Mitchell's business."120 By ignoring the harm caused to businesses, 
"[t]his court would poorly serve the law if it were to so blind itself to the realities 
101 Id. 
108 Id. at 823-27. 
109 Id. at 823. 
11o Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 824 (quoting Mitchell v. U.S., 267 U.S. 341, 345 (1925)). 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
mId. 
116 Kimball Laundry Co. v. U.S., 338 U.S. 1, 13 (1949) (quoting Boston Chamber of Com. 
v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910)). 
117 Hammer, 550 P .2d at 824. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
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of condemnation. " 121 By highlighting three flaws in the Mitchell approach, the 
Alaska Supreme Court strongly criticized the second theory for denying compensa-
tion for loss of profits. 122 
The Alaska Supreme Court also rejected the third theory for denying damages 
for loss of profits: the claim that loss of profits is too speculative.123 For the Hammer 
court, the "too speculative" theory was essentially an excuse not to compensate lost 
profits because lost profits are calculable and awarded in other legal contexts. 124 The 
Hammer court explained: "Loss of profits damages have been awarded in a variety 
of civil contexts, including tort actions (both personal and business), breach of con-
tract actions, antitrust suits, and suits for infringement of a patent or trademark."m 
To prove lost profits, Hammer held "damages must be 'reasonably certain"' to 
''the trier of fact" based on "evidence on the record and reasonable inferences there-
from, not from mere speculation and wishful thinking."126 The reasonable certainty 
standard only allows for provable damages, while preventing compensation for 
''truly speculative" claims, such as those that "depend on unrealized contingencies, 
unproved products, or the like."127 
After rejecting the three theories against compensating lost profits, the Alaska 
Supreme Court grounded its rationale in fairness reasoning because "[w]ithout such 
a rule, the State forces a property owner to pay a greater portion of the costs of a 
public project than any other taxpayer must pay by affiicting him with the unavoid-
able expenses ofcondemnation."128 This reasoning tracks the U.S. Supreme Court's 
rationale for just compensation: "The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private 
property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation was designed 
to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, 
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. "129 
Practical considerations also played a role in the Alaska Supreme Court's deci-
sion as the amount the government owes in incidental costs is "largely within the 
state's control."130 It can avoid paying these damages "by giving precise and early 
notice of the date when the property must be vacated," thus keeping ''the loss of profits 
due to necessary business interruption to a minimum.''131 By accommodating the 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 I d. See also EPSTEIN, supra note 60, at 54. Richard Epstein makes a similar argument: 
"no private defendant could escape payment if he forcibly ejected an owner from his place 
ofbusiness." Id. 
126 Hammer, 550 P.2d at 824-25. 
127 Id. at 825. 
128 Id. at827 (quoting Stewart&Grindle,Inc. v. S1ate, 524P.2d 1242, 1250 (Alaska 1974)). 
129 Annstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
130 Hammer, 550 P.2d at 827. 
131 Id. 
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property owner and allowing them ample time to prepare for an impending taking, 
"[t]he amount of such damages is a matter largely within the state's control."132 Such 
a solution would benefit both the property owner and the government. 133 
2. Modern Example: Louisiana-South Lafourche Levee District v. Ja"eau 
On January 10, 2011, the South Lafourche Levee District ("Levee District'') sent 
Jarreau a letter, telling him to "immediately cease and desist performing any and all 
activities" on a portion of his property. 134 The Levee District wielded the authority 
as a result of Resolution 11-01, m which appropriated Jarreau's property through 
''permanent levee servitude" for use in "hurricane protection projects. "136 The appro-
priation applied to 0.913 acres of Jarreau's "17.1 acre tract ofland," where he has his 
home and operates his business. 137 On his land, Jarreau runs Bayou Construction & 
Trucking Co., "a dirt excavation and hauling business."138 
Jarreau, however, continued his excavation of the appropriated land because he 
had ''to satisfy contractual obligations for Bayou Construction."139 Specifically, 
Jarreau had to fulfill "a contract for 23,000 cubic yards ... of dirt--enough to cover 
a football field nearly a foot deep!'140 It would be difficult for Jarreau to fulfill the 
contract unless he continued digging the appropriated land, because he had already 
"dug up pretty much the whole property."141 The appropriation took the back portion 
of his lot, but when he first began excavating he had "started in the front."142 Had 
he known the back tract of his land would be subject to an appropriation, Jarreau 
''would have started in the back."143 
In response to Jarreau's continued excavation ofthe dirt, "[o]n May 19,2011, 
the Levee District filed a petition to enjoin Jarreau from excavating and removing 
any more dirt from the appropriated servitude and sought monetary damages for the 
'wrongful' excavation."144 The Levee District followed this petition with a check to 
Jarreau "in the amount of $1,326.69 as compensation for the full market value of 
appropriated property. "14~ 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 S. Lafourche Levee Dist. v. Jarreau, 217 So. 3d 298, 302 (La 2017) (internal quota-
tions omitted). 
135 Id. at 301--02. 
136 Id. at 302--03. 
137 Id. at 302. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Sherman. supra note 37. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Jarreau, 217 So. 3d at 302. 
145 Id. 
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Jarreau disagreed with the Levee District's assessment of his property's worth 
and filed a counterclaim, seeking, among other things, "compensation for the ap-
propriated land, severance damages to the land, buildings, and improvements; [and] 
economic and business losses."146 His business, Bayou Construction, also joined the 
suit, "seeking compensation for lost profits, legal interest, and costs arising from the 
appropriation. "147 
The trial court ultimately agreed with Jarreau and Bayou Construction that 
compensation for the appropriation should extend to lost profits. 148 In assessing lost 
profits, the court examined the estimates ofJarreau's CPA and engineer, who carried 
out "extensive calculations of lost profits considering that because of the taking the 
defendants were no longer able to dig and sell dirt from this particular tract."149 In 
addition, "[t]he Court also made note of the fact that Mr. Jarreau stated, without 
contradiction, that the quality of the dirt in the rear tract that was taken was the best 
soil on his whole 17 acres.'o~~o In their writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, the 
petitioners summed up the factors the trial court considered: "(1) the particular 
quality of the dirt taken and the existence of a contract to sell some of that dirt, (2) 
the total quantity of dirt available for excavation on the property, (3) the cost of 
excavating and selling it, and (4) the price at which it could be sold."m 
As a result of these arguments, the trial court awarded "$164, 705.40 for economic 
and business losses."1~2 In addition, the trial court awarded ''the Levee District damages 
of$16,956.00 for the dirt [Jarreau] excavated from the appropriated property," but 
also "awarded Jarreau $11 ,869. 00 as just compensation for the appropriated tract. "1~3 
The Louisiana Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court's assessment "re-
vers[ing] the award of $164,705.40 against the Levee District."1~ The Louisiana 
Appeals Court claimed: "The current law under our amended constitution does not 
support any award for just compensation beyond the fair market value of the property 
on the date of the appropriation."15~ Therefore, the compensation does not include 
"lost profit damages associated with the value of the dirt in the Jarreau tract.''1' 6 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
14s Id. 
149 17th Judicial District Cowt for the Parish ofLafourche, Rendition ofJudgment and Hear-
ing on Motion, Relevant Excerpts, Oct. 17, 2014, App. 97, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp 
-content/uploads/2017/08/17-163-petition.pdf[https://penna.cc/2BWB-GA5A]. 
t5o Id. 
m Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, S. Lafourche Levee Dist. v. Jarreau, 217 So. 3d 298 
(2017) (No. 17-163). 
152 Jarreau, 217 So. 3d at 302. 
153 Id. at 302-03. 
154 S. Lafourche Levee Dist. v. Jarreau, 192 So. 3d 214, 228 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2016). 
mId. 
156 Id. 
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The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the Appeals Court's reversal of the lost 
profits awarded for the value of the dirt.157 The Court held that the 2006 Amendments 
to the Louisiana Constitution and statutes only required just compensation as "required 
by the Fifth Amendment" to the United States Constitution, which is based on the "fair 
market value of the property at the time of the appropriation."158 Prior to 2006, a more 
robust standard of compensation was in place for all takings.159 Specifically, in 1974, 
Louisiana enacted a constitutional requirement for compensation ''to the full extent 
ofhis loss."160 
Under the "full extent of his loss" standard, Louisiana "broadened the measure 
of damages"161 beyond both the "fair market value" and "severance damages to the 
remainder. '.t62 The broader standard required, in addition, that the impacted property 
owner "be placed in an equivalent financial position to that which he enjoyed before 
the taking. "163 The standard would include the compensation Jarreau sought, such 
as "inconvenience and loss of profits from the takings of business premises so that 
landowners were compensated for their loss, not merely the loss of their land. "164 
The 2006 amendment to the Louisiana Constitution, however, constricted com-
pensation for takings related to hurricane protection projects redefining '"full extent 
of the loss' to the more restrictive 'just compensation' measure required by the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution."165 Because of these limitations on 
compensation, the Louisiana Supreme Court restricted Jarreau's compensation to 
that ''required by the Fifth Amendment, which is the fair market value of the prop-
erty at the time of the appropriation. " 166 Therefore, the compensation did "not include 
loss [of] profits and other severance damages."167 
157 Jarreau, 217 So. 3d at 313. 
158 Id. at 302-03 n.5. 
m Id. at 306. 
160 Id. See also Tracy Lee Howard, Compensating an Owner to the Full Extent of His 
Loss: A Reevaluation ofCompensable Damages in Louisiana Expropriation Cases, 51 LA. 
L. REv. 821, 821-26 (1991) (providing background on the 1974 constitutional amendment 
requiring compensation ''to the full extent of his loss"). 
161 Jarreau, 217 So. 3d at 306. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 See LA. CONST. art. 1, § 4(G) (adding § 4(G) to limit compensation for hurricane 
projects); id. art. 6, § 42; LA. STAT.ANN. § 38:301 (C)(l)(h); LA. STAT.ANN. § 38:281(3)(de-
fming ''fair market value" for takings under article 1, section 4(G) and article 6, section 42); 
LA. STAT. ANN.§ 38:281(4) (redefining "full extent of the loss" for takings to a constricted 
understanding that "shall not exceed the market value" under article 1, section 4( G) and arti-
cle 6, section 42). 
166 Jarreau, 217 So. 3d at 311. 
161 Id. 
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Jarreau filed a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court, which it denied. 168 Both 
the petition and its denial generated news coverage, showing the public interest in 
addressing applications of just compensation.169 Even though the Court denied the 
petition, Jarreau's story is helpful in understanding why the Court should adopt a 
consistent application for consequential damages, rather than maintaining its incon-
sistent application of different standards for permanent and temporary takings.170 
ll.ARGUMENT 
The Supreme Court should adjust its standard for just compensation to extend to 
consequential damages, such as business losses. Louisiana's previous standard-
''placed in an equivalent fmancial position to that which he enjoyed before the 
taking"-better captures the spirit of just compensation. 171 Anything less than the 
equivalent position before the loss is not just compensation because the person is not 
being made whole for government actions taken against them.172 Moreover, the 
Court should extend the protections for temporary takings in Kimball Laundry to 
include permanent takings because permanent takings cause a more significant 
burden than temporary takings.173 
Eminent domain must adapt to the changing uses of property as ''the original 
rationale for denying business losses in eminent domain-[ that] most land taken was 
undeveloped land-has now been superseded by more modern principles. " 174 Alaska 
provides an exemplary account of how states should proceed, m but property owners 
168 Jarreau v. S. Lafourche Levee Dist., 217 So.3d 298, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 381 
(2017). See also Jarreau v. S. Lafourche Levee Dist., SCOTUSBLOG, http:/ /www.scotusblog 
.com/case-:files/cases/jarreau-v-south-lafourche-levee-district [https://perma.cc/FVC6-FHBZ] 
(showing proceedings and orders related to Jarreau, including denial of the petition on 
October 30, 2017). 
169 See, e.g., Aurora Barnes, Petition of the Day: Jarreau v. South Lafourche Levee District, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Sep. 7, 2017, 6:18PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/20 17 /09/petition-of-the 
-day-1220 [https://perma.cc/3LPM-T5HV]; Sherman, supra note 37. 
170 Kimball Laundry Co. v. U.S., 338 U.S. 1, 11, 14-15 (1949)(providingcompensationfor 
"demonstrable loss of going-concern value" under temporary takings). In contrast, compensa-
tion does not extend to permanent takings because ''the going-concern value has not been 
taken." Id. at 11. 
171 Jarreau, 217 So. 3d at 306. 
172 Home v. Dep't of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2434 (2015). 
173 Kimball, 338 U.S. at 23 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
174 Brief of Amici Curiae Don Howard Williams, Jr., And Owners' Counsel Of America 
In Support Of Petitioners at 3, S. Lafourche Levee Dist. v. Jarreau, 217 So. 3d 298 (La. 
2017) (No. 17-163), 2017 WL 4251906 [hereinafter Brief Amici Curiae Don Howard 
Williams]. 
m State v. Hammer, 550 P.2d 820, 825--27 (Alaska 1976). 
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need more than "a patchwork oflower court rules"176 and protections implemented 
by states. Citizens are entitled to just compensation and to being made whole. 177 
A. Jarreau Rlustrates the Need for Takings Compensation to Include Business Losses 
The Louisiana Supreme Court failed to compensate Jarreau for his business los-
ses. 178 Just compensation requires more than that-it requires Jarreau "be made 
whole" again.179 The fair market value compensation for Jarreau's land failed to fix 
the serious disruptions caused by the taking of his property.180 The Louisiana 
Supreme Court's inadequate compensation adversely impacted Jarreau on many 
levels: (1) it failed to award Jarreau the value of his dirt;181 (2) it disrupted the 
fulfillment of his business contracts;182 and (3) it imperiled his business's longevity 
and location. 183 
First, the award failed to provide him with adequate compensation for the value 
ofhis dirt.184 As Justice Hughes noted in his dissent, the Louisiana Supreme Court 
"afftrn1[ed] an award of$11,869 despite evidence in the record that the dirt taken 
from the land had a value in excess of $100,000."185 Jarreau built his business 
around the value of the dirt on his land, the value of which increases when it is 
excavated and prepared for a customer.186 The trial court recognized the dirt's signifi-
cant value, awarding Jarreau "$164, 705.40 as compensation for the business losses."187 
176 Brief Amici Curiae Don Howard Williams, supra note 174, at 3. 
177 Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 254--55 (1934); Brief Amici Curiae Don Howard 
Williams, supra note 174, at 18. 
178 S. Lafourche Levee Dist. v. Jarreau, 217 So. 3d 298, 313 (La. 2017). 
179 Olson, 292 U.S. at 254--55. 
180 Brief Amici Curiae NFIB, supra note 52, at 19. The fair market value ''formulation 
over looks the indisputable market value of commodities rooted in the land itself. ... Indeed, 
none of the appraisals for the fair market value of the condemned land approximated the 
independent market value of the underlying dirt." /d. 
181 !d. at 20 ("[U]nder Louisiana's hardline rule, the farmer would be denied compensation 
for 'lost profits' if the land were condemned at harvest-just as Mr. Jarreau has been denied 
compensation for his carefully cultivated commercial-grade dirt."). 
182 !d. at 11 ("[T]he South Lafourche Levee District took the land and destroyed an estab-
lished property right (i.e., a contract) with concrete economic value.''). 
183 Brief Amici Curiae Pacific Legal Foundation, supra note 49, at 13 ("Indeed, when real 
property supporting an established business is condemned, the owner is forced either to re-
locate or lose his or her investment.''). 
184 Brief Amici Curiae NFIB, supra note 52, at 20. 
185 S. Lafourche Levee Dist. v. Jarreau, 217 So. 3d 298, 315 (La. 2017) (Hughes, J., 
dissenting). 
186 Brief Amici Curiae NFIB, supra note 52, at 20 ("[T]he government should provide 
independent compensation for the loss of transferable business assets created or cultivated 
through investment of capital and sweat equity.''). 
187 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 151, at *7. 
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Given that the Levee District initially offered $1,326.69 for Jarreau's land-less than 
one percent of the trial court's compensation for the land--property owners need more 
robust just compensation protections against government overreach and abuse. 188 
The trial court's actions help illustrate the high value of the excavated dirt com-
pared to the value of the land itself.189 The trial court essentially determined that the 
dirt Jarreau excavated from the appropriated tract, ''without permission, after the 
District had appropriated it," was worth more than the whole appropriated tract of 
land because Jarreau had to pay more in damages to the Levee District for the ex-
cavated dirt than the fair market value of the appropriated tract of land. 190 
The market value test for property is an inadequate measure of compensation 
in order to fully compensate property owners who suffer business losses.191 Accord-
ing to Richard Epstein, the problem with market value-''the price a willing seller 
would receive from a willing buyer"-is that it "still contains a systematic bias that 
underestimates the use value, which is typically in excess of its exchange value."192 
In a scenario where the market value is lower than the current use value, ''the present 
owner will not sell at market price because selling will deprive him of the surplus 
he obtains from present use, perhaps because the property is customized to his own 
needs or provides him with speciallocational advantages."193 Essentially, takings 
can force transactions that would not occur at the fair market price because the prop-
erty's use value could be higher for the owner. 
Second, the taking disrupted Jarreau's fulfillment of contracts with customers.194 
Without any advance notice, the government abruptly prevented him from utilizing 
his property to farm dirt for a contract requiring 23,000 cubic yards of dirt.195 To 
stop that process midstream on the government's whim and time frame should be 
188 Jarreau, 217 So. 3d at 302. 
189 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 151, at *4, *7. 
190 Jarreau, 217 So. 3d at 298 ("[t]he decision below allows [the Levee District] to pay 
Jarreau less than $12,000----even though the Levee District itself argued in the same pro-
ceeding that Jarreau had caused it more than $16,000 in damages by removing some of that 
same dirt from the property after it was acquired."); Brief Amici Curiae NFffi, supra note 
52, at 16 ("[11he lower court awarded Petitioners only $11,869.00 for the land, but awarded 
$16,956.00 to the District 'for the dirt that Mr. Jarreau excavated after the tract had been 
appropriated."'). 
191 Brief Amici Curiae NFIB, supra note 52, at 19 (The fair market value ''formulation 
over looks the indisputable market value of commodities rooted in the land itself .... Indeed, 
none of the appraisals for the fair market value of the condemned land approximated the in-
dependent market value of the underlying dirt.''). 
192 EPS1EIN, supra note 60, at 182--83. 
193 Id. at 183. 
194 Brief Amici Curiae NFIB, supra note 52, at 11. 
19~ See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 151, at *6; Jarreau, 217 So. 3d at 302 
(showing how the taking occurred abruptly and without advanced notice. The letter "demanded 
that they 'immediately cease and desist performing any and all activities upon the property 
as appropriated"'). 
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accounted for through the compensation calculation.196 Additionally, the taking 
would not only halt ongoing contracts, but also prevent new business development; 
potential clients would be forced to go to a different excavator, and current relation-
ships with clients would discontinue.197 The government's taking of Jarreau's land 
had the same effect as Hammer-where the government forced Kito to relocate his 
bar, disrupted the operation ofthe business, and contributed to a loss ofprofits.198 
Finally, Jarreau cannot simply relocate to a comparable location because he lives 
at his business.199 He has literally built his life around his business.200 Although it is 
potentially conceivable to relocate, fair market value does not tend to include re-
location costs.201 It would be a significant burden for Jarreau to relocate, especially 
given his ties to the land as his place of business and his home. 202 
Even if Jarreau does not relocate immediately as a result of the taking, the govern-
ment's action will require him to relocate earlier than he might have planned. With the 
exception of the tract of land taken by the Levee District, Jarreau "dug up pretty 
much the whole property.'>203 He had projected that he could stay on the property much 
longer, but the government's taking may force him to have to transfer locations earlier 
than anticipated.204 Moreover, depending on the business, location is key.20~ A bar 
relocating, for instance, may not be able to easily keep all of its clientele-it has estab-
lished a brand in that particular area. 206 And for a dirt farmer like Jarreau, the quality of 
196 State v. Hammer, 550 P.2d 820, 827 (Alaska 1976). 
197 Luberv. Milwaukee Cty, 177N.W. 2d 380,384 (Wis. 1970). "[l]he [fair] market value 
standard ... generally excludes recompense for incidental losses--losses typified by damage 
to or destruction of good will, expenses incurred in moving to a new location and profits lost 
because of business interruption or inability to relocate." I d. The practice continues despite 
the fair market value standard ''reflect[ing] dubious wisdom and logic .... " Id. 
198 Hammer, 550 P.2d at 823. 
199 Jarreau, 217 So. 3d at 302 ("Jarreau's home is situated on the front portion of the tract ... 
and he operates Bayou Construction & Trucking Co .... over the remainder of the tract."). 
200 See id. 
201 See Luber v.Milwaukee Cty., 177 N.W. 2d 271, 384 (Wis. 1970). 
202 Brief Amici Curiae Don Howard Williams, supra note 174, at 15 ("Compensation is 
not 'just' when it allows the condemnor to artificially compensate only for the land, and not 
for the fact that a business which is integral to that land and cannot be easily relocated is wiped 
out by the taking.''). 
203 Sherman, supra note 37. 
204 Id. ("I dug up pretty much the whole property. I started in the front. I would have 
started in the back."). 
205 Brief Amici Curiae NFIB, supra note 52, at 8 ("The business might entirely lose its 'trade 
routes' if forced to relocate to another City, where it must start fresh."). See also Lynda J. 
Oswald, Goodwill and Going-Concern Value: Emerging Factors in the Just Compensation 
Equation, 32 B.C. L. REv. 283, 353 (1991) ("The Hammer court thus held that a temporary 
loss of profits during relocation resulting from the taking of property on which a business 
was conducted was a 'damaging' of property for which the Alaska constitution mandates 
compensation."). 
206 See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae NFIB, supra note 52, at9--1 0 ("[O]ur hypo1hetical family-run 
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the dirt could play a significant role in satisfYing existing and future customers.207 In 
both circumstances, the businesses will suffer from the disruptions caused by the 
relocations.208 Many customers will find new businesses to serve their needs in the 
time it takes for a business to relocate. 209 
Since the government forces the property owners into an involuntary transac-
tion, the government should bear the burden it causes to others.210 Surely, it is the 
government's job to protect the people, and it should not be permitted to harm 
citizens unless it provides compensation to make those citizens whole again.211 As 
Hammer reminds us, all other parties in society can be held responsible for lost 
profits in other legal settings, such as tort actions and breach of contract actions, yet 
the government receives a free pass when it forces citizens into an involuntary 
transaction. 212 Furthermore, people can insure against other unexpected occurrences 
in the their life, such as devastating weather. Insurance should not be necessary for 
property owners as ''the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment [acts as] a form of 
insurance," compensating for the losses caused to an individual.213 
restaurant might provide evidence that with condemnation its only available option for 
relocation was to a neighboring community," where ''the company's base of regular customers 
has been displaced.''). 
207 See id. at 7-8 (''Condemnation may also inflict long-term injuries, as small businesses 
may fm.d it difficult (sometimes impossible) to locate a comparable site that will satisfY their 
business needs with an affordable price-point.''). 
208 See id. at 7 ("Small businesses are especially vulnerable because eminent domain may 
cause temporary disruptions.''). 
209 See id. at 7-8. 
210 See Baileyv. United States, 78 Fed CL 239,260 (Fed. Cl. 2007) (explaining how eminent 
domain is an involuntary transaction: "[O]nce the involuntary 'transaction' accomplished by the 
eminent domain process is completed ... that interest is no longer the property owner's to sell.''). 
211 See LOCKE, supra note 58, at 62; see also United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 
(1970). 
212 State v. Hammer, 550 P.2d 820, 824 (Alaska 1976). See also Tara Kinman, Striking 
a Balance in the Valuation ofTemporary Takings: Examining the Award of Lost Profits in 
Primetime Hospitality, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 40 N.M. L. REv. 33 7, 346 (20 1 0) (providing 
another example where lost profits are recoverable: "[M]odern conversion law has recog-
nized that lost profits are recoverable as a consequential damage in all but one jurisdiction.''). 
213 Eric K.ades,Avoiding Takings "Accidents": A Tort Perspective on Takings Law, 28 U. 
Rica L. REv.1235, 1240--4 7 (1994) (highlighting, in one part, the theory of''no compensation" 
as a replacement for just compensation. Under no compensation, property owners purchase their 
own insurance, rather than relying on the insurance provided by just compensation). The ''no 
compensation" theory argues that the Takings Clause essentially provides free insurance, 
creating economic inefficiencies as property owners enter into economically inefficient ven-
tures. Normally, under private insurance, they would avoid these ventures because they 
would have to pay a premium to receive coverage, making it an inefficient option compared 
to other, less-risky ventures not requiring insurance. However, the assumption built into the 
argument is that the government will actually adequately compensate the party involved, 
similar to a private insurer. Id. 
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B. Rebutting Three Theories Against Awarding Compensation for Consequential 
Damages, Such as Lost Profits 
Hammer highlights three theories for not awarding compensation for lost prof-
its: (1) ''that damage to personal property need not be compensated for"; (2) "that 
the state has taken the land only, and not the business"; and (3) ''that the damages 
are too speculative to be awarded."214 These theories are not only problematic at the 
state level, but also the national level and the way we interpret the Constitution's 
Takings Clause.m 
1. Damage to Personal Property 
In Hammer, the Alaska court awarded compensation for damage to personal 
property because the Alaska Constitution had more stringent protections for just 
compensation than the U.S. Constitution, which "does not expressly require com-
pensation for damage to property."216 However, the distinction in the language is 
without major difference: the U.S. Constitution states "nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation," while Article 1, Section 18 of the 
Alaska Constitution, states ''Private Property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without just compensation."217 It seems the only major difference in the language 
is Alaska includes protections for "damages," while the U.S. Constitution does not 
explicitly mention damages to personal property.218 
The Supreme Court, however, has recognized that a proper understanding of the 
Takings Clause and just compensation would extend to consequential damages, such 
as "future loss of profits, the expense of moving removable fixture and personal 
property from the premises, the loss of good-will which inheres in the location of 
the land, or other like consequential losses. "219 In the 1945 case of United States v. 
General Motors Corporation, 220 the Court explained that "if the owner is to be made 
whole for the loss consequent on the sovereign's seizure of his property," business 
losses and other consequential losses "should properly be considered."221 Then, the 
Court declined to extend protections to these losses. 222 The Court openly provided 
less than what just compensation, properly interpreted, would require. 223 
214 Hammer, 550 P.2d at 823. See also Michael Debow, Unjust Compensation: The 
Continuing Need for Reform, 46 S.C. L. REv. 579, 586 (1995); Oswald, supra note 205, at 
351-54. 
215 See Hammer, 550 P.2d at 824. 
216 Id. 
217 U.S. CONST. amend. V.; ALASKA CONST. art. I,§ 18. 
21s Id. 
219 United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 379 (1945). 
220 323 u.s. 373 (1945). 
221 Id. at 379. 
222 Id. at 379---80. 
223 See Kinman, supra note 212, at 346 ("[T]he Court noted that consequential damages 
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The Court in General Motors Corporation highlighted three reasons for extend-
ing protections to businesses losses and other consequential damages. 224 The first 
reason was that anyone selling their property would consider those factors in their 
valuation.:w Surely, the Court admitted, "all these elements would be considered by 
an owner in determining whether, and at what price, to sel1."226 
Second, the Court acknowledged that "if the owner is to be made whole for the loss 
consequent on the sovereign's seizure of his property, these elements should prop-
erly be considered.'>227 In other words, to make someone whole from injury, just com-
pensation would require consideration of these factors to reach a determination of 
proper compensation. 228 Anything less fails to make the property owner whole again. 229 
Finally, the Court's definition of property would require protections under the 
Takings Clause as the definition extends beyond the land itself. 230 The Court defined 
property as ''the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical thing, 
as the right to possess, use and dispose of it. '>231 Under that definition, property extends 
beyond the land itself, also including the use of the land and how to "dispose of it. " 232 
Therefore, property under the Takings Clause necessarily includes property beyond 
the land itself, including the right to use the property and the built up "good-will 
which inheres in the location of the land" from operating a business on the land. 233 
The Court's definition of property, therefore, affords property owners more protec-
tion under the Takings Clause than the Court actually extends.234 
The Court, through these three reasons, essentially admitted it improperly inter-
preted the Takings Clause. 235 The arbitraty determination holds the government to 
a different standard than the rest ofsociety.236 Despite the Court's blunt honesty, it 
maintained the rule in place, disregarding any possible obligation to compensate 
business losses and other consequential losses. 237 The Court should shift its current 
could be considered in calculating market value, as they would likely be used in determining the 
price an owner would accept for the property; however, they were not awardable as indi-
vidual damages in condemnation cases."). 
224 General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. at 377-79. 
225 Id. at 379. 
226 Id. 
227 Id. 
22
' Id. 
229 See id. 
230 Id. at 377-78. 
231 Id. at 378. 
232 !d. This understanding of the property also corresponds with Madison's understanding 
as laid out in his essay, Property. Madison, supra note 65. 
233 General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. at 379. 
234 Id. at 379--SO. 
235 See id. at 377-79. 
236 See State v. Hammer, 550 P.2d 820, 824 (Alaska 1976) (finding lost profits calculable 
and awardable in other legal contexts). 
237 General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 379--SO. 
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interpretation to meet the broader definition of property acknowledged by the Court 
itself and actually protected by the Alaska Supreme Court. 
2. The State Has Taken the Land Only, and Not the Business 
In Hammer, Alaska had greater protections in place for just compensation than in 
Mitchell. However, the Alaska court still criticized Mitchell Court's understanding 
of the Takings Clause that ''the state takes only the land," thus compensation does not 
flow to property owners for business losses. 238 Specifically, in Mitchell ''the destruc-
tion" of the business ''was an unintended incident of the taking of the land. "239 The view 
"look[s] at the benefit to the condemnor as a measure of compensation," not the 
"loss of the owner."240 The eminent domain proceeding, as interpreted by Mitchell, 
"fails to provide a realistic measure of what has been taken."241 
The harms caused by excluding business losses from just compensation could 
be significant. For example, farmers make huge investments into their land as they 
"expend thousands of dollars in preparing land, planting, fertilizing, managing pests 
and irrigating a crop."242 From there, the "farmer reasonably expects to make at least 
a modest return on investment--consistent with prevailing markets. "243 But when 
the government intervenes, the farmers may no longer be able to fulfill ''production 
contracts to sell their products to suppliers long before harvest."244 As a result, the 
farmers could face serious costs as they ''may be forced either to pay money back 
to the purchaser or to buy commodities from another party in order to avoid a breach 
when their lands are condemned."245 Under the Mitchell standard, where the govern-
ment is heavily favored at the expense of the property owner, the farmer suffers 
significant losses without compensation because the government's taking will not 
be compensated beyond the value of the land. 246 
Like farmers who have their land "condemned at harvest" Jarreau was "denied 
compensation for his carefully cultivated commercial-grade dirt," while disrupting his 
contracts to customers.247 As the amici parties explain, "[i]n condemning Mr. Jarreau's 
property, the [government] took the land and destroyed an established property right 
(i.e., a contract) with concrete economic value.'>248 "[A] realistic measure of what has 
been taken" would include business losses, such as the broken contract. 249 
238 Hammer, 550 P.2d at 823. 
239 Id. at 824 (quoting Mitchell v. U.S., 267 U.S. 341, 345 (1925)). 
240 Id. 
241 Id. 
242 Brief Amici Curiae NFIB, supra note 52, at 20. 
243 Id. 
244 Id. 
245 Id. 
246 See Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341, 345 (1925). 
247 Brief Amici Curiae NFIB, supra note 52, at 20. 
248 Jd. at 11. 
249 State v. Hammer, 550 P.2d 820, 824 (Alaska 1976). 
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Since the federal interpretation of the Takings Clause is weak in its protections, 
property owners, like Jarreau, must rely on state protections.2so But in some cases, 
the protections are not as robust as Alaska's, leaving property owners in a worse 
position than before the taking.~1 But asHammerpoints out, the federal government 
standard "simply ignor[ es ], for the pwposes of compensation, the destruction of'' 
businesses. ~2 The government fails to effectively protect the people, or even worse, 
directly harms the people, by "blind[ing] itself to the realities of condemnation!'~3 
The farmer example further illustrates how takings can result in a diminution of 
value in the remaining land, which also diminishes the ability to generate profits.~• For 
farmers or even ranchers, "a taking that severs an existing farm or ranch may greatly 
diminish the potential to generate future revenue on the remaining parcel because 
a smaller plat ofland has less production capacity."m Similarly, Jarreau's remaining 
land will suffer a diminution in value due to a decrease in productive capacity.~6 
3. Damages Are Too Speculative 
Despite claims that damages are too speculative, they are not seen as too specula-
tive in other legal settings.m As Hammer illustrated: "Loss of profits damages have 
been awarded in a variety of civil contexts, including tort actions (both personal and 
business), breach of contract actions, antitrust suits, and suits for infringement of a 
patent or trademark. "~8 Moreover, there is a check on abusing compensation for lost 
profits259-the burden ofproofis on the party claiming the losses: "Since such loss 
of profits is an item of special damages, the condemnee has the burden of proving 
by a preponderance of the evidence the amount of profits lost as a direct result of the 
state's taking; such proof must meet the requirement of reasonable certainty as in-
dicated. "260 Essentially, the argument that loss of profits damages are too speculative 
is quite an overstatement. 
250 See Brief Amici Curiae Don Howard Williams, supra note 174, at 3. 
251 CompareS. Lafourche Levee Dist v. Jarreau, 217 So. 3d 298, 311 (La 2017) (com-
pensating takings in Louisiana does ''not include los[t] profits''), with Hammer, 550 P.2d at 
825-27 (compensating takings in Alaska includes lost profits). 
252 Hammer, 550 P.2d at 824. 
253 Id. 
254 Brief Amici Curiae NFIB, supra note 52, at 21 n.21. 
255 Id. 
256 Id. 
257 Hammer, 550 P.2d at 824. 
258 Id. 
259 I d. at 824-25 ("In any case seeking loss of profits, such damages must be 'reasonably 
certain': the trier of fact must be able to determine the amount oflost profits :from evidence on 
the record and reasonable interferences therefrom, not :from mere speculation and wishful 
thinking."). 
260 I d. at 827. 
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C. New Standard for Just Compensation: (1) Expand Kimball Laundry to 
Permanent Takings and (2) Adopt Louisiana's Previous Standard 
1. Reasoning of Kimball Laundry Should Apply to Both Temporary and 
Permanent Takings 
1307 
In the Respondent's Brief in opposition to Jarreau's writ of certiorari to the 
Supreme Court, the Levee District argued that Kimball Laundry grants compensation 
for going-<:oncern value ''when the government takes temporary use of a business for 
itself, •• which is not ''the case in any permanent taking of fee business property. "261 
While the Respondent correctly interpreted Kimball Laundry, the Court should 
reconsider its arbitrary distinction between temporary and permanent takings. 262 
Justice Douglas, in his Kimball Laundry dissent, disagreed with the majority's 
distinction between permanent and temporary takings: "[w]hy the latter is compen-
sable when the former is not is a mystery."263 Justice Douglas found permanent 
takings to be more harmful to property owners than temporary takings, explaining 
"[t]here would be a complete destruction of the trade-routes if the taking of the plant 
were permanent and a depreciation of them (I assume) where it is temporary."254 
Justice Douglas questioned the Court's distinction because he opposed compen-
sating consequential damages in any taking-temporary or permanent-but his 
point inadvertently helps illustrate why both temporary takings and permanent 
takings should receive compensation.265 Specifically, if permanent takings are po-
tentially more burdensome on a business, they should receive similar, not less, 
compensation for business losses under the Fifth Amendment.266 
The Court in Kimball Laundry down played the impact a permanent taking could 
have on a business. 267 Consider, for example, a similar situation to Kimball Laundry, 
where all else is the same, except the government permanently takes the laundromat. 
261 Brief in Opposition at 20, 22, S. Lafourche Levee District v. Jarreau, 217 So. 3d 298 
(La. 2017) (No. 17-163), 2017 WL 4251905. 
262 See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Compensation for Takings: How Much is Just?, 42 CAm. 
U. L. REv. 721, 746 (1993) ("While there are factual differences between the paired cases 
(temporary rather than permanent taking, private party rather than government as the source 
of the expectation, leasehold rather than fee interest), it is not clear that these factual dif-
ferences justify the differing outcomes."). 
263 Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 23 (1949) (Douglas, J ., dissenting). 
264 Id. 
26~ Id. 
266 See Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age of Redevelopment: Incidental Losses, 67 
YALEL.J. 61, 83-84 (1957) (''But here again, the condemnee in a temporary taking seems 
no more deserving of special consideration than a condemnee whose fee is taken and whose 
entire good will is destroyed.''). 
261 Kimball Laundry, 33 8 U.S. at 11 ("[O]nly the physical property has been condemned, 
leaving the owner free to move his business to a new location.''). 
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This action could be incredibly disruptive and have a devastating impact on a 
business's intangible value, such as goodwill.268 For instance, in a large city, the 
laundromat's success is based on how well it serves its nearby customers, building 
up trust, while offering convenient service.269 Taking the property and requiring the 
business to transfer to a new location hurts the intangible value of the business--
customers will not follow despite the good service because the convenience of a 
closer laundromat will likely prevai1.270 The business would need to start from 
scratch and compete against others for clients.271 In Kimball Laundry, the business 
had operated for at least "eighteen years preceding the taking. "272 Moving the busi-
ness to a new location, away from its customer base, could have a devastating impact 
on the business's profits, built upon the goodwill of its customers. 273 
In circumstances where a business operation is not easily transferable to a new, 
comparable location, compensation should be granted for consequential intangible 
losses, such as the loss of an established customer base. 274 
2. Adopt Louisiana's Pre-2006 "Full Extent of the Loss" Standard for Just 
Compensation275 
In 1974, Louisiana enacted a Constitutional requirement for compensation "to 
the full extent of [the] loss," adjusting the previous 1921language of''just and adequate 
compensation. 'm6 The "full extent of [the] loss" standard "broadened the measure 
of damages," requiring that the impacted property owner "be placed in an equivalent 
financial position to that which he enjoyed before the taking."277 These included 
261 See Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age a/Redevelopment: Incidental Losses, supra 
note 266, at 74--75. 
269 See id. ("[Goodwill] inheres in the business aside from the physical property and grows 
from the personality and ability of the proprietor, the reputation of the business and the cus-
tomers' habit of dealing with a firm due to its tradition and familiarity."). 
270 See id. at 75 ("[For] good will, often completely destroyed or greatly damaged when 
the owner must move from the neighborhood to some other locale, American courts rarely 
admit giving compensation.''). 
271 See id. 
272 Kimball Laundry, 338 U.S. at 8. 
273 See Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age ofRedevelopment: Incidental Losses, supra 
note 266, at 75 ("[D]ismissing [goodwill] loss, as one court has, by stating that 'a good plumber 
should be able to continue his business in almost any location and do as well as he formerly 
did in a neighborhood where in many homes there was a lack of adequate plumbing facili-
ties,' expresses business naivete.''). 
274 See id. at 74--75. 
m S. Lafourche Levee Dist. v. Jarreau, 217 So. 3d 298, 306 (La 2017). 
276 I d. See Megan S. Peterson, Condemnation Blight: The Need for Adoption in Louisiana, 
57 LOY. L. REv. 299,307 (2011); see also Howard, supra note 160, at 821. 
277 Jarreau, 217 So. 3d at 306. 
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"inconvenience and loss of profits from the takings of business premises so that 
landowners were compensated for their loss, not merely the loss of their land. "278 
The "full extent of the loss" standard is similar to the protections provided in Kimball 
Laundry, except it extends to both permanent and temporary takings. 279 Most im-
portantly, the standard accurately reflects what has been taken, while the current 
federal Mitchell standard, "fails to provide a realistic measure of [this]. "280 
D. Practical Benefits: Compensation for Lost Profits Would Force the 
Government to Change Its Approach to Eminent Domain in Two Crucial Ways 
Two big practical benefits will flow from a requirement that compensation ex-
tends to lost profits. First, the government will be more cautious in choosing to use 
its eminent domain power since it could result in higher costs. 281 This could help pre-
vent abuses as in Kelo, where the government claimed the land for a supposedly better 
purpose, yet ultimately harmed the community.282 By providing broader compensa-
tion for takings, such as consequential damages and incidental losses, the government 
would more carefully use its eminent domain power, and only when absolutely nec-
essary.283 In addition to using the power more sparingly, it also could lead to better 
choices for use of the takings power. Essentially, the government will try to select 
a condemnee who will be least impacted by the taking to avoid high compensation 
costs.284 For example, in the case of Jarreau, if just compensation included lost profits, 
the government might have pursued a different source of dirt if a lower cost option was 
available. While the source might not be as conveniently located as Jmreau's dirt, the 
government could have a cost incentive to acquire the dirt elsewhere, perhaps from a 
dirt plot not currently in use for a business. These prudent selections of takings would 
benefit the person operating the business, but also the customers who interact with the 
business, lessening disruptions to business transactions and the broader economy. 28~ 
mId. 
279 Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S.1, 13 (1949) (quoting Boston Chamber 
of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910)). 
280 State v. Hammer, 550 P.2d 820, 823 (Alaska 1976). 
281 Statev. AlaskaLaserWashlnc., 382P.3d 1143, 1153 (Alaska2016)(Fabe,J., dissenting 
in part) ("[B] ecause the State could control the amount of damages by, for example, 'giving pre-
cise and early notice,' a business owner could claim lost profits as additional compensation.''). 
282 McGeehan, supra note 17. 
283 Brief Amici Curiae Pacific Legal Foundation, supra note 49, at 15 ("[B]y preventing 
the government from transferring the business costs associated with condemnation to individual 
owners---which is precisely what occurs when such losses are excluded from compensation--the 
govermnent is forced to consider the full and actual costs and benefits of eminent domain.''). 
284 !d. ("As a result, the government will make more economically efficient condemnation 
decisions.''). 
m I d. at 16 ("If this prevents some public projects from going forward, it is only because 
the projects did not make overall economic sense in the first place.''). 
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The second major benefit is that the government would have an incentive to 
offer the business reasonable advance notice, providing more time to adjust to the 
disruption.286 Rather than the challenges of adjusting to the random actions of the 
state, a reasonable time frame to respond to the taking would alleviate some of the 
costs to businesses. 287 When the government taxes citizens, it does not randomly 
choose days and capriciously spring costs on them, upending their lives. 288 If it did, 
people would revolt. The current, scheduled taxation system allows citizens to plan 
their budget, spending, and life according to the predictable yearly occurrence of 
Tax Day. Some targets of eminent domain are not as fortunate to have advance 
notice, causing serious disruptions in their lives. 289 Abuse of the tax power would 
likely stir political changes because taxes apply to every member of society.290 
Because eminent domain only impacts a small minority of the population, there is 
likely less political willpower behind reforms.291 
For Jarreau, advance notice could have been far less disruptiv~92 and could have 
allowed him to complete his contractual obligations, keep his customers, and search 
for a new location for his business. 293 
CONCLUSION 
The Takings Clause does not require "some form of compensation," but ''just 
compensation" for a government taking. A proper understanding of just compensa-
tion cannot ignore real consequential harms that result from a taking. The Supreme 
Court in General Motors Corporation admitted as much: "[I]f the owner is to be 
made whole for the loss consequent on the sovereign's seizure of his property, these 
elements should properly be considered. "294 By inconsistently providing consequen-
tial compensation for temporary takings and not permanent takings, the Supreme 
286 State v. Hammer, 550 P.2d 820, 827 (Alaska 1976). 
287 Id. 
288 See, e.g., IRS, Tax Filing Season Begins Jan. 29, Tax Returns Due Apri/17; Help 
Available for Taxpayers (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/2018-tax-filing-sea 
son-begins-jan-29-tax-returns-due-April-17 -help-available-for-taxpayers [https :/ /perma cc 
IW2D5-SJGK]. 
289 See id. 
290 See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BEIL J. ECON. & MGMT. 
SCI., 12 (1971) (''The system is calculated to implement all strongly felt preferences of ma-
jorities and many strongly felt preferences of minorities but to disregard the lesser preferences 
of majorities and minorities."). 
291 See id. 
292 S. Lafourche Levee Dist. v. Jarreau, 217 So. 3d 298, 302 (La. 2017) (showing how the 
taking occurred abruptly and without advanced notice). The letter "demanded that they 'imme-
diately cease and desist performing any and all activities upon the property as appropriated.'" 
293 Brief Amici Curiae NFIB, supra note 52, at 7. 
294 United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 379 (1945). 
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Court has a foot in two irreconcilable camps.295 The Court should reconsider its stance 
on permanent takings in order to create a consistent standard that adequately protects 
its citizens, similar to the previous "full extent of the loss" standard in Louisiana.296 
Society and the Court should not become comfortable with interpretations of the law 
that bypass foundational legal protections at the expense of a small minority in the 
name of convenience, cost saving, or the public good. 297 
295 Id. See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 14, 15 (1949). 
296 See Jarreau, 217 So. 3d at 306. 
297 See Armstrongv. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960) (''The Fifth Amendment's guar-
antee that private property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation was 
designed to bar government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, 
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."); State v. Hammer, 550 
P.2d 820, 827 (Alaska 1976) ("Placing such a burden on the property owner is no more ... 
just than assessing a levy against him but no others.''); Peterson, supra note 276, at 304 ("[T]he 
public is better equipped than the individual landowner to bear the burden of public improve-
ments."). See also Madison, supra note 65 (explaining how an unjust government takes 
property "by arbitrary seizures of one class of citizens for the service of the rest"). 
